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Abstract
Background: When a privately owned firm or privatized government entity raises
capital by selling its stocks for the first time to general public, is known as initial
public offering (IPO). The underpricing phenomenon and ownership structure are
important characteristics of IPO process that significantly affect the short–run and
long–run performance of private firm and privitized entity. This study compares the
short-and long-run performance, and factors affecting these performances for both
private IPOs and privatized IPOs in Pakistan. It further investigates the relationship
between capital structor and initial underpricing for both group of IPOs.
Methods: Event study methodology is used to compares short- and long-run
performance spanning from March 2000 to June 2015 of two categories of IPOs
issued in the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). Multivariate regression analysis is applied
to examine the factors that affect the short-run and long-run performance as well as
for investigating the relationship betwen underpricing and ownership structure for
both group of IPOs.
Results: We find that both categories outperform in IPOs at which they are offered
to investors on first day of trading, although differences in mean are insignificant.
Over a five-year buy-and hold strategy, privatizing IPOs outperform and private IPOs
underperform returns on the benchmark KSE 100 Stock Index. The results reveal that
the size of the private firm or government entity, aftermarket risk of IPOs, and
subscription ratio are significantly associated with the underpricing of IPO shares
brought to market. First-day returns, market volatility and retained ownership are
associated with higher five-year performance. We find that the concentration of
ownership is similar, for both categories of IPOs; and significantly positive related to
underpricing. The size of the firm/entity, aftermarket risk, return on assets and
subscription ratio also affect ownership concentration.
Conclusions: Same level of underpricing in both private and privatized IPOs reveals
that Pakistan’s government is committed to its privatization policies as they
developed capital markets by underpricing of IPOs. To make dispersion in ownership
structure and to involve more small investors, the regulatory authorities such as
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP are required to take some
steps to minimize concentration in ownership structure. There is a need of some
specific range of underpricing by issuers and SECP.
Keywords: Initial public offering, Underpricing, Aftermarket performance, Private
owned firms, Public owned firms, Capital structure, Pakistan
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Background
An initial public offering (IPO) is a mechanism by which a privately owned company
sells its common shares to the general public for the first time. IPOs are also the mech-
anism by which governments privatize public sector entities (i.e., transfer their owner-
ship and control to the private sector, where they are managed as commercial
activities). Shares sold via IPOs enter trading on public equity markets (Barnes and
Walker 2006). On the day that they are issued, shares offered via IPOs generally close
at prices exceeding the price at which they were offered to investors. Thus, some
studies argue that IPO shares generally are underpriced (Aggarwal, 1993; Loughran
and Ritter 2000). However, empirical evidence from developed markets indicates
that long-run performance of IPO shares tied to the performance of broader markets
(Levis 1993; Aggarwal et al. 1993).
Numerous studies examine initial and aftermarket performance of IPO shares in de-
veloped countries, but few address emerging markets. Even fewer explicitly compare
price behaviors of IPOs involving privately owned firms and those that involve privatiz-
ing public sector entities. Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Jenkinson and Mayer (1988), Jac-
quillat (1987), and Perotti and Guney (1993) suggest that underpricing is greater
among IPOs for privatized public entities than it is among IPOs for privately owned
firms. Empirical evidence also suggests that share prices for private enterprises under-
perform during their initial three-to-five years of aftermarket trading, whereas priva-
tized public.entities generally outperform in long-run trading.1 However, those results
pertain to developed markets and may differ in emerging capital markets. The only
Pakistani study is by Rizwan and Khan (2007), who compared the short- and long-run
performance of IPOs of publicly owned enterprises and privately owned firms by sam-
pling 35 offerings from 2000–2006. The paucity of scholarship motivates this study.
This study measures, analyzes, and compares the short- and long-run performance of
IPOs. We define “short-run performance” as the price behavior on the first day that an
IPO trades and “long-run performance” as the price behavior spanning five years fol-
lowing an IPO. It examines IPOs for both privately owned firms (private IPOs) and
public entities (privatizing IPOs) listed on Pakistan’s Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). It
examines the factors that affect initial underpricing on the first day of trading and after-
market performance for both groups of IPOs.
We further investigate the relationship between ownership structure and initial under-
pricing of private and privatized IPOs. When “going public,” firms may seek to concen-
trate ownership to sequester gains among their owners and reduce agency cost, or they
might wish to disperse ownership to enhance aftermarket liquidity. The ownership struc-
ture is pivotal to corporate finance in emerging markets (LaPorta et al., 1999).
We extend the literature by investigating two anomalies: the short-run outperform-
ance and long-run underperformance of private and privatizing IPOs in Pakistan. We
also compare the ownership structure and underpricing of both categories of IPOs. No
previous research addresses either subject in Pakistan.
Our results indicate that private and privatizing IPOs outperform on their first trad-
ing day. In the long run, private IPOs underperform and privatizing IPOs outperform
although the mean difference between them is insignificant in the short and long runs.
The size of the firm, aftermarket risk, and subscription ratio significantly influence
underpricing. First-day returns, market volatility, and retained ownership determine the
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IPOs’ performance over five years. Ownership concentration in both categories is simi-
lar. The extent of underpricing, firm size, aftermarket risk, return on assets, and sub-
scription ratio affect the concentration of ownership.
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews IPOs in Pakistan. Section 3 presents
an empirical review, theoretical background, and hypothesis development. Section 4
discusses the method, variables, and data sources. Section 5 presents the empirical re-
sults. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses policy implications.
Overview of ipos in Pakistan
IPOs are not new in Pakistani capital markets. On April 2, 1949, Karachi Electric Supply
Corporation became the first company to list on the KSE,2 albeit without a prospectus. In
1953, M/s Hussain Industries launched the practice of issuing a prospectus to encourage
subscriptions from the public. Political instability and nationalization impeded the issu-
ance of IPOs from 1953 to 1990. Reforms in 1991 strengthened capital markets. There-
after private firms issued IPOs to diversify ownership and financing, and their numbers
rose substantially from 1991 to 1996. The Pakistani government also began to privatize
public entities to encourage domestic and international investment through enhanced
efficiency and transparency. During the next decade, privatization gathered momentum,
although generally without improving transparency or operating performance, and slowed
from 2008 to 2013. Pakistan’s present government has revived privatization with the in-
tent improving on those objectives. Initially, Pakistani IPOs came to market only under a
fixed-price offer method. Equity markets required more efficient and investor-friendly
mechanisms, and the book-building method was introduced in March 2008. Few private
investors participate in Pakistani stock markets. Business ownership is concentrated
among family members, and it might be less costly for firms to issue debt than equity.
From liberalization in 1992 until 1999, the KSE averaged 35 IPOs yearly. The number
dwindled to an average of seven yearly. This decrease may be attributable to social, polit-
ical, and security issues such as the sanctions imposed in 1998 after Pakistan conducted
nuclear tests. There was one IPO in 1998 and none in 1999. Pakistani stock market activ-
ity diminished after 9/11 until 2003. Trading increased from 2004 until the 2007–2008
global financial crisis. Overall only ninety IPOs came to market from 1999 to March 2015.
Literature review
This section reviews earlier studies of IPO underpricing, long-run performance and
ownership structure.
Empirical literature
On average, investors briefly earn positive abnormal returns from an IPO, a phenomenon
known as initial underpricing. Ibbotson (1975) reported that IPOs are underpriced 11.4%
by comparing issue prices with prices after one month of trading. Document initial under-
pricing of 16.8% using a larger sample. Other studies that confirm initial underpricing in-
clude Ritter (1984), Miller and Reilly (1987), Tinic (1988), Beatty (1986), Carter and
Manaster (1990), and Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988).
Initial underpricing phenomenon is not confined to the US. Aggarwal, Leal, and
Hernandez (1993) report initial underpricing of 78.5% in Brazil in a sample of 62 offerings
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from 1980–1990, 16.3% in Chile (36 IPOs from 1982–1990), and 33.0% in Mexico (44
IPOs from 1987–1990).
Evidence indicates underpricing among IPOs of privatized public entities. Jenkinson
and Mayer (1988) show they are underpriced an average 25.1% in France and 22.2% in
the UK. Perotti and Guney (1993) find that IPOs of privatize public enterprises are
underpriced in Turkey, Malaysia, and Spain. They suggest there are strong regularities
in privatization programs in these countries. Governments generally retain substantial
stakes in privatized public entities and offer only partial ownership through IPOs.
Studies that compare privatizing IPOs with private IPOs present contradictory evidence
(Choi and Nam 1998; Vieira and Serra 2006; Breda et al. 1997). Menyah and Paudyal
(1996) document that privatizing IPOs generate significant positive initial market-
adjusted returns compared to private IPOs in the UK. In their eight-country sample,
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) find evidence that only in the UK, privatizing IPOs are
more underpriced than private IPOs (Malaysia, Canada, Japan, France, Poland, Thailand,
Hungary, and the UK). In contrast, Paudyal et al. (1998) find that initial underpricing of
privatizing IPOs significantly exceeds underpricing of private IPOs in Malaysia.
Jelic and Briston (1999) confirm those results for Hungary, as do Setiobudi et al.
(2011) for Indonesia and Aussenegg (2000) for Poland. Aussenegg (2000) argues that
Poland’s market-oriented government (Perotti, 1995) tries to elevate its reputation as a
privatizer by offering high initial returns.
Another anomaly of IPOs is their poor long-run price performance. Ritter (1991) first
documented this phenomenon, finding that US IPOs generated average three-year
holding period returns of 34.37%. Using Ritter’s sample, Yi (1992) finds that Ritter’s re-
sults extend six years after going public. Loughran and Ritter (1995) use a larger sample
of IPOs and find poor stock performance extending five years after issue, with no fur-
ther underperformance in the sixth year.
International comparisons of long-run performance for private and privatizing IPOs yield
mixed evidence. Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Levis (1993), and Keloharju
(1993) show that private IPOs generally underperform three to five years in aftermarket
trading. Other studies indicate that privatizing IPOs outperform private IPOs in the long-
run. See Menyah and Paudyal (1996) for the UK, Jelic and Briston (1999) for Hungary,
Ikoku (1998) for Nigeria, and Portugal. However, Paudyal et al. (1998) document no abnor-
mal difference in long-run performance between privatizing and private IPOs for Malaysia,
as do Aussenegg (2000) for Poland and Rizwan and Khan (2007) for Pakistan.
Earlier research employs assorted explanatory variables to examine long-run after-
market performance. Cai, Liu, and Mase (2008) find that Chinese IPOs market are in-
fluenced by offer size, underpricing, oversubscription, and earnings growth. Chen et al.
(2011) argue that long-run underperformance supports the signaling hypothesis and
the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis but not the divergence of opinion hypothesis. They
conclude that earnings per share, offer size, aftermarket risk, and seasoned equity offer-
ings impacting Chinese IPOs.
Lemmon and Lins (2003) and La Porta et al. (1999) consider whether ownership
structure reduces agency problems between insiders and outsiders that may affect
firms’ valuations. Empirical results from examining IPO underpricing are ambiguous.
Pham et al. (2003) find a negative association between shareholdings of the top 20 in-
vestors in Australian IPOs. Shehryar and Javid (2014) for Pakistan and Chen and
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Strange (2004) for China find a negative relation between ownership concentration and
underpricing, supporting the ownership dispersion hypothesis. In contrast, Venkatesh
and Neupane (2005) find no significant association between ownership concentration
and underpricing among Thai IPOs.
Only one study compares private and privatizing IPOs in Pakistan. Rizwan and Khan
(2007) examine 2000–2006 and find that initial market-adjusted returns of private and
privatizing IPOs are significantly underpriced, but the mean differences are not statisti-
cally significant. They also report that firm size and the percentage of outstanding
shares offered during an IPO significantly affect underpricing.
In sum, the literature suggests that considerable work remains in comparing results and
anomalies among private and privatizing IPOs, especially in emerging markets like Pakistan.
Theoretical literature and hypothesis development
Several models provide theoretical frameworks for studying short-run and long-run
performance of IPOs. Asymmetric information and the winner’s curse hypothesis (Rock
1986) assert information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors.
Informed investors subscribe to IPOs only when they expect positive initial returns,
whereas uninformed investors subscribe promiscuously to IPOs. Given that issuers
must attract uninformed and informed investors, they generally must underprice their
issues to provide uninformed investors acceptable rates of return.
Rock’s (1986) model describes underpricing as an ongoing search for equilibrium.
However, that situation creates adverse selection problems when IPOs are underpriced.
Given that the quantities awarded are rationed between uninformed and informed in-
vestors, offerings are over-subscribed by substantial multiples. That assures a positive
relationship between underpricing and oversubscription. Koh and Walter (1989) and
Michaely and Shaw (1994) confirm the implications of Rock’s model.
It is argued that private IPOs generally involve large and well-known firms and that
governments try to make abundant information available prior to IPOs wherein they
privatize public entities. These efforts might create information asymmetry in both pri-
vate and privatizing IPOs. We propose Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: The means of initial market-adjusted returns from IPOs that privatize
public entities are lower than for IPOs that involve privately owned firms.
Theories of asymmetric information argue that uncertainty over the value of recently
established firms (i.e., new issues) exceeds uncertainty surrounding well-known firms. As a
result, investors worry more about their future, post-IPO performance. There may be a posi-
tive relation between underpricing and such ex-ante uncertainty Beatty and Ritter (1986).
Signaling models (Allen and Faulhaber 1989; Welch 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang
1989) hold that issuers might have better information about a firm’s value than out-
siders. Therefore, high value firms may underprice their IPOs and retain insider owner-
ship to signal their superior quality. Thereafter, owner/managers can price subsequent
offerings higher or enjoy greater gains on the equity they retain. If so, there is a positive
relationship between initial market-adjusted returns and ratio of shares retained by in-
siders. However, the relationship between underpricing and retained ownership is nega-
tive for IPOs that privatize public sector entities.3
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A successful IPOs in one in which the market price on the first day of trading does not
fall below the issue price. Documents that if market volatility is high, regulators try to
minimize the probability of unsuccessful issues by lowering prices, which amplifies under-
pricing. Thus the relation between underpricing and the market volatility is positive.
Divergence of opinion theory suggests IPOs attract investors who are most optimistic
about the issue. As a practical matter, market prices are set by this group rather by in-
vestors overall. Further, the greater the uncertainty about the value of an IPO, the more
optimistic investors will pay relative to other investors. In the long-run, more informa-
tion about the issuer becomes available, and divergence of opinion between groups of
investors narrows. Consequently, market price falls. Miller (1977) predicts that IPOs,
especially riskier issues, underperform in the long run.
Hypothesis 2: Long-run price performance of IPOs that privatize public entities sig-
nificantly exceeds that of IPOs involving privately held firms.
Positive long-run performance by privatizing IPOs serves the objectives market ori-
ented governments. Privatization programs generally last several years, and committed
governments want to build a sustained reputation for supporting privatization. We test
the following hypothesis for Pakistan:
Hypothesis 3: Five-year aftermarket performance of privatizing IPOs is nonnegative.
Boycko et al. (1996) show that the ratio of shares governments retain during IPOs is
important for maintaining the credibility of restructuring public enterprises. If lower
state ownership portends more efficient restructuring, the long-run performance of
IPO shares may be positive.
Investor sentiment theory argues that overly optimistic investors over value IPO
prices in the short-run, which erodes long-run performance (Aggarwal and Rivoli,
1990); Ritter (1991); Loughran and Ritter (1995). Privately owned firms consider inves-
tors’ over-optimism when timing IPOs. If investors shed their optimism over time,
long-run performance erodes (investor sentiment hypothesis). We use the subscription
ratio as a proxy for investor optimism and expect to find negative relations between
subscription ratio and long-run performance.
Signaling theory suggests that issuers use the retention ratio to broadcast the quality
of an IPO. A high retention ratio indicates higher quality by implying that owners are
reluctant to relinquish promising cash flows. Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) and Menyah
and Paudyal (1996) show that underpricing of privatizing IPOs in the UK exceeds
underpricing of IPOs involving privately held firms and that governments retain large
stakes in privatized entities long after transferring ownership to the private sector.
Hypothesis 4: The relation between ownership structure and underpricing is higher
for privatizing IPOs than for private IPOs.
Method and data
Determinants of IPOs underpricing in public and private owned firms
We examine determinants of underpricing for privatizing and private IPOs through
multivariate cross-sectional analysis of the first day of trading. A dummy variable with
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market-adjusted returns to compare the two categories of IPOs takes the value 1 for
privatizing IPOs and 0 otherwise, following Setiobudi et al. (2011). We use OLS regres-
sion to estimate this model4:
MARi ¼ β0 þ β1Pubi þ β2M Volti þ β3F Sizei þ β4Subsi þ β5Ret owni
þ β6Riski þ β7I Proceedsi þ εi ð4:1Þ
In Eq. 4.1, MARi is market-adjusted abnormal returns of issue i on the first day of
trading. Pubi is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the IPO involves a government entity
and 0 otherwise. M_Volti denotes market volatility over two months prior to issue i.
F_Sizei is firm size of issue i, which includes the size of both group of firms. Subsi is
subscription ratio of issue i. Ret_owni is retained ownership by public and private firms
of issue i.5 Riski is aftermarket risk of public entities and privately owned firms. I_Pro-
ceedsi denotes revenues received from the issue i. The βs are parameters to estimate. εi
is the error term.
Determinants of long-run performance of private and privatizing IPOs
We investigate determinants of long-run abnormal returns those exceeding a bench-
mark index for privately owned firms and public entities using the same model (4.1)
with an additional variable for market-adjusted abnormal returns on the first day.
BHARi ¼ β0 þ β1MARi þ β2Pubi þ β3MVolti þ β4FSizei þ β5Subsi
þ β6Retowni þ β7Riski þ β8 IProceedsi þ εi ð4:2Þ
BHARi is aftermarket long-run abnormal returns of issue i over five years.
Ownership structure and underpricing
We follow the methodology of Pham et al. (2003) to compare the relationship between
underpricing and ownership structure for both categories of IPOs. We use characteris-
tics of private firms and public entities such as subscription ratio, return on assets, size,
and risk as factors that influence ownership structure. The following cross-section
model is estimated by OLS:
Ownershipi ¼ β0 þ β1Pubi þ β2MARi þ β3FSizei þ β4Subsi þ β5ROAi þ β6Riski þ εi
ð4:3Þ
All independent variables remain the same as in Model (4.1). We measure concentra-
tion and unbalanced ownership structure using the HHI and proportions of shares
owned by holders of large blocks (BLOCK).
Definition and construction of variables
Measure of initial returns
We analyzed initial returns using daily market-adjusted returns calculated by traditional
event study methodology (Suchard and Singh, 2007).
We measured initial market-adjusted abnormal returns for the first day of trading as
the difference between initial raw returns and the raw return for the KS-100 index for
both categories of IPOs. Returns are dividend adjusted. To calculate initial abnormal
returns, we adjusted the raw returns with the returns of market index so as to remove
the effect of general movements in share prices Dewenter and Malatesta (1997).
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MARi is market-adjusted abnormal returns of stock i on day t. Pi;t and Pi;t1 repre-
sent adjusted closing prices on days t and t-1. Ii;t and Ii;t1 are closing values of the
market index on the corresponding ith issue on days t and t-1. To test the null hypoth-
esis that the mean MARi of private IPOs equals that for privatizing IPOs, we use
p values per Setiobudi et al. (2011).
Measure of aftermarket performance
To measure aftermarket performance of IPOs, we first calculate buy-and-hold returns
for each issue using event study methodology.6 Price performance measured as buy-
and-hold returns has the advantage over cumulative returns of being based on a realis-
tic ex-ante trading strategy. We use compounded abnormal returns over a specific







Ri;t is the return of IPO i in period t. t =1 indicates the first day of aftermarket trad-
ing.7 BHARs are calculated for T = 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months and
6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, and five years.
Aftermarket performance is measured against the KSE-100 Index as a benchmark
value-weighted index. The BHR of the KSE-100 Index to the corresponding of IPOi
BHRKSE;i;t
 
is calculated in the manner portrayed in Eq. (4.6). For each corresponding
IPO, the product of all previous returns of the KSE-100 are calculated up to their speci-
fied time periods as given above.
Use of market indices as benchmarks is common in the literature.8 This measure is
suitable for investigating short-run aftermarket performance Kooli and Suret (2004), es-
pecially in Pakistani capital markets, where lengthy time gaps are more persistent than
in developed markets. We measure short-run aftermarket-adjusted abnormal returns
on the first trading day and long-run aftermarket market-adjusted returns over five
years for both categories of IPOs.
As Ritter (1991) and Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest, we measure abnormal buy-





















In Eq. 4.8, n is the number of IPOs sampled. Following Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999),
we use skewness-adjusted bootstrapped p-values to test the null hypothesis that the
mean BHARs of private and privatizing IPOs are similar.
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Following Ritter (1991), we measure wealth relatives (WRs) to compare the perform-
ance of an IPO against the benchmark.10 Values exceeding (below) 1 mean an IPO out-
performs (underperforms) its benchmark. WR is calculated as:
WRT ¼ 1þ Average BHRi;t1þ Average BHRKSE;t ð4:9Þ
WRT is wealth relative over period T. Average BHRi;t is average abnormal buy-and-
hold return of issue i over period t. Average BHRKSE;t is average buy-and-hold return
for the reference portfolio over period T.
Measures of ownership structure
Ownership of quality firms is concentrated among investors who hold large blocks of
stock. Most Pakistani firms are owned by the families or institutions (Cheema et al.
2003). Therefore as a proxy for unbalanced ownership we use block holdings i.e., inves-
tors who own more than 5% of issued equity. We calculate this proxy below per Bren-













Here, Si belongs to the i
th largest shareholder (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5). HHI spans from nearly
0 to 10,000, as close. Proximity to 0 (10,000) means low (high) concentration. To deal
with possible normality in the HHI, we replaced the original value of the index with its
square root (Pham et al., 2003).
Description of other variables
Firm Size: Size may indicate firm’s quality or reduced information uncertainty. It is mea-
sured as the natural log of total assets of issuing firms, at the end of 12-month period
nearest the time of listing (Suchard and Singh, 2007).
Issue Proceeds: Issue proceeds are measured by the natural log of market capitalization
after IPO shares begin trading. Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying the num-
ber of shares issued by their offer price.
Subscription Ratio: The subscription ratio is the number of IPO shares buyers
wish to purchase divided by the number offered (Al-Hassan et al. 2010; Habib and
Ljungqvist 2001).
Retained Ownership Ratio: The number of shares retained by the issuer as a percent-
age of total shares issued.
Risk: Standard deviation of daily share returns during the first month of aftermarket
trading (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Leech and Leahy 1991). The level of risk affects
underpricing.
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Market Volatility: Standard deviation of daily share returns of the KSE-100 Index for
two months prior to an IPO (Paudyal et al. 1998).
Return on Assets: Return on assets (ROA) is net income divided by total assets.
Darmadi and Gunawan (2013) use this measure.
Data and sample
We sample all 61 private firms and 11 public entities that listed IPOs on the KSE from
March 2001 to June 2015. Although numbers for public entities seem small, they mir-
ror the IPO process in a country where privatization is its infancy.
Ours is an event study, so we collected data daily, weekly, and monthly. Sampled
firms offered shares to the public via the fixed price method. Data related to the size of
private firms, ROA, and ownership structure are from annual reports and prospec-
tuses. Information about issuers, listing dates, offered capital, and subscription ratio
is from Capital Issuing Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission of
Pakistan. Daily opening-closing stock prices and the KSE-100 index are from the
KSE database and other financial websites. We excluded some IPOs from analysis
because data were unavailable.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of determinants of market-adjusted initial returns and proxies for
ownership structure are in Table 1.
Panels A, B and C in Table 1 compare all IPOs. IPOs for private firms, and IPOs for
privatized public entities on the KSE from March 2000 to June 2015. Descriptive statis-
tics reveal that arithmetic means and medians are close to each other and positive i.e.,
data show little variation. Standard deviations cluster near all means. Results for owner-
ship structure indicate that on average 57% (52%) of the shares of private firms (priva-
tized entities) are retained by investors owning more than 10,000 shares listed on the
KSE. This means that ownership is slightly more concentrated in private than in privat-
izing IPOs. About 24% of shares in privatizing IPOs and 31% in private IPOs are held
by owners of large blocks (more than 5% of the shares).11 The (HHI) describing the
concentration of ownership among the top five shareholders is 17% for privatizing IPOs
and 18% for private IPOs, an insignificant difference.
Short-run and long-run performance of private and privatizing IPOs
Short-run initial return
Table 2 compares descriptive statistics of short-run initial raw returns and market-
adjusted initial returns for all IPOs, IPOs for privately owned firms, and IPOs for public
entities. Initial raw returns are 23.49, 27.32 and 22.79%, respectively. Average market-
adjusted initial returns are positive across the board: 23.32% for the whole sample,
27.65% for privatization of public entities, and 22.54% for private IPOs. These returns
propose that investors who subscribe to Pakistani IPOs at the issue price and hold their
shares through the first day of trading receive considerable gains. Returns for all issues
and private IPOs average differ significantly from zero, in line with findings. Results
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Initial Returns of Private and Privatizing IPOs
Initial Raw Return Initial Market adjusted Return













Mean Difference between public & private (p-value) 4.53 (0.75) 5.11 (0.72)
Median 9.198 20.943 8.158 8.940 19.763 6.956
Maximum 144.186 75.056 144.186 142.459 74.186 142.459
Minimum −96.496 −9.531 −96.496 −98.101 −10.107 −98.101
Std.dev 43.114 26.333 45.616 43.377 27.022 45.835
Obs. 72 11 61 72 11 61
Note: To test mean difference between private and privatized IPOs initial returns in short run (first trading day) p-values
are presented in the parenthesis. The *** and ** indicates significance at 1% and 5% level respectively
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: All IPOs
N = 72 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
I_Proceed 5.649 5.379 9.001 2.603 1.357
Risk 0.109 0.059 0.557 0.004 0.133
Ret_own 0.788 0.796 0.989 0.167 0.151
Subs 3.204 1.909 18.694 0.060 3.643
M_volt 0.049 0.015 1.114 0.006 0.159
Block 0.297 0.192 0.980 0 0.333
HHI 0.180 0.125 0.646 0.004 0.165
Panel B: Privatized Firms
N = 11 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
I_Proceeds 7.495 7.465 9.001 4.700 1.306
Risk 0.120 0.072 0.540 0.021 0.149
Ret_own 0.865 0.900 0.989 0.619 0.116
Subs 2.690 2.337 7.450 0.130 2.126
M_volt 0.019 0.019 0.033 0.010 0.008
Block 0.242 0.112 0.886 0.000 0.317
HHI 0.173 0.126 0.592 0.024 0.177
Panel C: Private Firms
N = 61 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
I_Proceeds 5.317 5.165 7.830 2.603 1.076
Risk 0.108 0.059 0.557 0.004 0.132
Ret_own 0.774 0.750 0.986 0.167 0.153
Subs 3.296 1.870 18.694 0.060 3.859
M_volt 0.054 0.014 1.114 0.006 0.172
Block 0.307 0.210 0.980 0.000 0.337
HHI 0.182 0.124 0.646 0.004 0.164
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indicate that privatizing IPOs are more underpriced than private IPOs (Aussenegg,
2000; Rizwan and Khan 2007).
Differences between initial raw returns and market-adjusted means for both categor-
ies of IPO are positive (4.53 and 5.11%, respectively) but not statistically significant.
These results neither support asymmetric information theory for initial returns and nor
confirm Hypothesis 1 (Aussenegg, 2000).
Aftermarket performance
Five-year aftermarket performance for all IPOs, private IPOs, and privatizing IPOs ap-
pear in Table 3.
The results reported in Table 3 indicate that unlike returns for IPOs, in the short
run, five-year aftermarket returns differ among the three samples. For all IPOs, the
mean (median) buy-and-hold five-year abnormal return is -65.54% (−72.42%) and mean
values are statistically significant. Wealth relative (WR) is 0.97, suggesting Pakistani
IPOs underperform in the long-run. Negative BHAR values are consistent with Ljungq-
vist (1996) and Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994). They argue that overly optimistic
investors push market prices up during the first day of trading, but revise their enthusiasm
in the long-run, thereby generating underperformance.
Privatizing IPOs generate statistically significant five-year buy-and-hold returns of
80.46%. This result suggests that governments might pursue market-oriented polices
but exert little impact on price behavior. That finding conflicts with Perotti (1995), Jelic
and Briston (2003) and Aussenegg (2000).
The mean (median) BHAR value five-year returns of private IPOs is -91.86%
(−83.49%) and statistically significant. Private IPOs in Pakistan underperform in the
long-run. These results are mirror evidence of Jelic and Briston (2000) for the
Hungarian private sector and Rizwan and Khan (2007) for Pakistan (two-year performance).
With regard to dataset, in measurement of aftermarket long-run BHAR, the num-
ber of observed IPOs declines in increasing order. The decay in number of observa-
tions is attributable to inadequate duration of trading for newly listed companies
(fewer than five years). Data include all available returns for listed companies within
five years of an IPO.
The results presented in Table 4 show that the difference in BHAR between private
IPOs and privatizing IPOs is negative in the first year and positive for two-to-five years,
but differences are insignificant throughout the period. However, BHR in the fifth year
is positive and significant, a finding that rejects Hypothesis 3. This evidence accords
with findings by Paudyal et al. (1998) for Malaysia and contradicts evidence for
Hungary from Jelic and Briston (1999).
Results of regression analysis
Determinants of short-run underpricing for private and privatizing IPOs
We regressed one-day market-adjusted initial returns on a dummy of public owned
firms interacting with market-adjusted initial returns, market volatility, issue proceeds,
firm size, retained ownership, level of company risk, and oversubscription.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 show that the dummy comparing private and privatizing
IPOs displays no significant effect on long-term underpricing, indicating that
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Table 3 Aftermarket Performance of IPOs
Sample Period N BHR% WR BHAR%
Issues KSE Mean Median
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anomalous underpricing is identical in both categories of IPO. This result contradicts
asymmetric information theory. Lee, Taylor, and Waltor (1996), Choi and Nam (1998),
and Huang and Levich (1998) confirm this outcome.
There is a positive and significant relation between the risk that indicates ex-ante un-
certainty surrounding an IPO and underpricing. This result substantiates Ritter (1984)
and Beatty and Ritter (1986) that investors demand higher returns to compensate for
fears over future performance.
The positive and significant influence of subscription ratio on first-day market-
adjusted returns supports the absorption capacity of the market (Paudyal et al. 1998)
and the winner’s curse model (Rock 1986). Firm size bears a negative relation to first-
day market-adjusted returns. Teker and Ekit (2003), Tian (2011), Megginson and Weiss
(1991), and Ibbotson et al. (1994) confirm this finding.
Retained ownership displays no significant relationship with underpricing. This result
conflicts with Schindele and Perotti (2001).
There is no significant correspondence between market volatility and initial under-
pricing, a result is in line with Omran (2005).
Table 3 Aftermarket Performance of IPOs (Continued)

















































To test whether BHARs of both categories of IPO differ statistically, p values are given in parenthesis. The a, b, c indicate
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Results for issue proceeds show no significant relation to initial underpricing, which is con-
sistent with Setiobudi et al. (2011). Independent variables explain 48% of the variation, which
is reasonable for cross-section regression. The F-test indicates strong model fit with the data.
Determinants of long-run performance i.e., abnormal five-year buy-and-hold returns
are reported in the final two columns of Table 5. The relationship between first-day
underpricing and long-run performance is negative, significant, and confirmed by Ritter
(1991) and Kooli et al. (2006). This result supports the information asymmetry hypoth-
esis that overly optimistic investors misvalue stock prices, thereby earning higher initial
returns but prompting long-run underperformance.
Subscription has an insignificant relation to long-run performance. Although higher
subscription ratios amplify initial underpricing, they show no significant later associ-
ation to long-run performance.
Retained ownership has a positive and significant correspondence to long-run
performance. Gounopoulos et al. (2012) demonstrate a similar result. This result
suggests that governments intent on efficient restructuring retain smaller ownership
in privatized public entities, and lessened political influence improves long-run
performance.
Firm size and aftermarket risk demonstrate an insignificant correspondence with
long-run performance indicating, confirming Omran (2005). Market volatility is related
positively and significantly to long-run performance, indicating that higher market vola-
tility is associated with better long-run performance. This finding supports the ex-ante
uncertainty hypothesis.
Underpricing and ownership structure of private firms and privatized public entities
To measure ownership concentration and unbalanced ownership, we use two proxies:
Block and HHI. We regressed both against first-day market-adjusted returns and separ-
ately against firm characteristics of risk, size, return on assets, subscription.
Table 5 Determinants of First Day IPOs Underpricing and Aftermarket Long-run IPOs Performance
for Public and Private Owned Firms
First Day IPOs Underpricing Long-run IPOs Performance
Dependent variable: First day market
adjusted return
Dependent variable: buy and hold abnormal
return over 5 years
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
MAR_1 −1.13*** −3.19
Pub 0.08 0.63 0.82 1.27
M_Volt −0.37 −1.19 0.16*** 2.81
I_Proceeds −0.05 −1.25 −0.11 −0.68
F_Size −0.04*** −2.15 −0.02 −0.27
Ret_own −0.24 −0.76 0.19*** 2.53
Risk 0. 14*** 2.10 0.16 1.05
Subs 0.04*** 2.04 0.06 0.84
Constant −0.45* −1.78 −1.28 −1.18
R2 0.48 0.28
F Stat (p value) 0.0000 0.0004
Note: OLS estimation with standard errors adjusted using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively
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Table 6 presents the results of testing the relation between ownership structure and
underpricing for both categories of IPOs. The dummy for privatized entities is insignifi-
cant, suggesting ownership concentration is similar for both categories of IPOs.
First-day mean market-adjusted returns relate inversely to ownership concentration.
These results defy signaling theory, which suggests that concentrated ownership signals
issuers’ assessments of firm quality and generates underpricing. This result coincides with
studies by Michealy and Shaw (1994), Brennan and Franks (1997), and Pham et al. (2003).
Results also reveal that firm size and aftermarket risk relate negatively and signifi-
cantly in both categories of IPOs, whereas growth (ROA) is positively and significantly
ties to ownership concentration only among owners of blocks. Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find significant relationships between firm char-
acteristics and ownership concentration.
Oversubscription correlates positively and significantly with ownership structure.
This result confirms Booth and Chua (1996), who argue that a firm’s owners seek to re-
tain a desired degree of ownership.
Conclusion and policy implications
This study has compared IPOs by privately owned firms and IPOs that privatized gov-
ernment entities in Pakistan. It examined their short-and long-run price behavior on
the Karachi Stock Exchange from 2001-2015.
Results showed that all Pakistani IPOs during the period were underpriced 23.32% on
their first day of trading, whereas private IPOs were underpriced 22.54% and privatizing
IPOs 27.65%. However, these mean differences are not statistically significant. These simi-
larities suggest that Pakistan’s government is committed to privatization and underpriced
IPOs for public entities. This result confirms Perotti (1995) and Ausenegg (2000).
For both categories of IPOs, determinants of underpricing are the size of the firm or
public entity, aftermarket risk, and subscription ratio. Our findings support the winner’s
curse model (Rock 1986).
Long-run price behavior of IPOs shows mixed results. Private IPOs outperform for
one year and over three-to-five years. BHARs are negative in the long-run for all IPOs
and private IPOs. Perhaps overly optimistic investors elevate prices by increasing their
initial subscription ratios and later modify their long-run enthusiasm, generating the
Table 6 Effects of Underpricing on Ownership for Private and Privatization IPOs
Dependent Variable: Block Dependent Variable: HHI
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Pub 0.06 0.65 0.06 1.07
F_Size −0.04** −2.46 −0.02** −2.50
MAR −0.14** −2.40 −0.07*** −2.69
Risk −1.01** −2.57 −0.46** −2.18
ROA 0.06* 1.80 0.02 1.14
Subs 0.02** 1.84 0.05** 1.91
Constant 1.08* 3.11 0.64*** 3.28
R2 0.25 0.27
F Stat (p value) 0.04 0.04
Note: OLS estimation with standard errors adjusted using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix.
The ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively based on t-test
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underperformance noted by Ljungqvist (1996), Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994).
Among public IPOs, BHAR outperforms in the short-run and up to five years, a finding
consistent with Perotti (1995). However, the positive mean difference in long-run for
privatized and private IPOs is statistically insignificant. This evidence for Pakistan ac-
cords with findings by Paudyal et al. (1998) for Malaysia but contradicts evidence from
Jelic and Briston (1999) for Hungary.
Determinants of five-year aftermarket returns for private and privatizing IPOs include
first-day market-adjusted abnormal returns, market volatility, and proportion of shares
owned. Findings for first-day market-adjusted return support the information asym-
metry hypothesis overly optimistic investors bid up prices, generating higher initial
returns, and prices decline as they moderate their enthusiasm, resulting in subsequent
underperformance (Ritter 1991; Kooli et al. 2006).
Results for ownership concentration are similar for both categories of IPOs, a find-
ing that contravenes signaling theory. First-day market-adjusted initial returns have
negative and significant correspondence to ownership concentration. Firm/entity size
and aftermarket risk correlate negatively, whereas firm/entity growth and oversub-
scription correlate positively with concentration. These results support those in
Michealy and Shaw (1994), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and
Booth and Chua (1996).
On the bases of above stated results, the study proposes some implications. Regula-
tory authorities such as Securities and Exchabge Commission of Pakistan (SECP) are
required to take some steps to minimize concentration in ownership structure of new
issues. This will make dispersion in ownership structure and to involve more small in-
vestors which are mostly uninform of IPOs prices. As underpricing is indirect cost of
any issue for the firm, so issuer/regulators must set a specific range of underpricing to
achieve its objective of dispersed ownership. The awareness increase the participation
of more investors that will enhance performance of new issues.
Endnotes
1Evidence for a significantly positive long-run performance of public IPOs is also pro-
vided by Choi et al. (2000) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2000).
2KSE was established on September 18, 1948.
3Political considerations might dictate lower retention ratios to preserve the credibility
of transferring control to the private sector. A government committed to privatization will
underprice its IPO, producing a negative relationship between price and the fraction of
ownership offered by an IPO.
4Setiobudi et al. (2011) and Omran (2005) use OLS to estimate IPO performance
models.
5Subscription ratio is the number of IPO shares buyers wish to purchase divided by
the number offered while retained ownership is the number of shares retained by the
issuer as a percentage of total shares issued. In short, Subscription ratio is attained by
investor behavior and retained ownership is linked with issuer.
6MAR measures short-term, first-trading-day, average market-adjusted abnormal
returns. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are used to measure an IPO’s long-run per-
formance. This method uses the product of all previous raw returns.
7Returns are adjusted for dividends.
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8See Keloharju (1993) for the IPO market in Finland, Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) for
Switzerland, or Paudayal (1998) for Malaysia.
9Ausenegg (2000) and Boissin and Sentis (2012) use a similar formula.
10Wealth relative (WR) is a term and used as a performance indicator of an IPOs.
11See Pham et al. (2003), where 43% of shares are held by block -holders in 113
private IPOs.
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